Libertarianism, Compatibilism and Moral Responsiblity: A Philosophical Introduction to Available Models. Part 5

Summary and Conclusions


Two basic models of freedom have been surveyed in this series of posts. First, I considered a variety of libertarian models. PAP, the principle of alternative possibilities, is the most significant motivation for libertarian freedom. Frankfurt’s counter-examples to the ability of these alternative scenarios to function as robust grounds for moral responsibility seem to me to be fairly convincing. I have considered a series of responses to these objections, but Fischer seems to have demonstrated that each of these do not hold up for one reason or another. Compatibilism offers a differing model of freedom that does not depend upon events in the alternative sequence, but grounds responsibility in the actual sequence, which seems intuitively to be the environment for the locust of freedom in any case. I develop this point further in a forthcoming set of posts on divine providence. Of the available compatibilist accounts of freedom, semi-compatibilism provides the most rigorous and intuitive appeal from my perspective since its analysis is grounded in a plausible notion of control and reasons responsiveness in the actual sequence mechanism. This paves the way for a nuanced account of divine providence and human freedom that I will pursue in my next set of posts.


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